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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since 1972, scholars have used the term “jurymandering” to describe jury 
selection procedures that eliminate classes of citizens from the adjudicative 
process.1  Today, the most prominent mass exclusion of prospective jurors targets 
the estimated nineteen million Americans with a felonious criminal history.2 
Forty-nine states, the federal government, and the District of Columbia 
restrict convicted felons’ opportunities to serve as jurors.3  One of the primary 
justifications for such restrictions is the inherent bias rationale.4  The inherent bias 
rationale supposes that convicted felons, if allowed to serve, would threaten the 
impartiality of the jury because, as a homogeneous group, convicted felons harbor 
an impermissible pro-defense/anti-prosecution pre-trial bias.5  Yet, this supposition 
lacks support.  Instead, the only empirical study of the inherent bias rationale 
suggests that convicted felons’ pre-trial biases are varied, and that the strength of 
                                                                                                                       
1   See Comment, “Jury-mandering”: Federal Jury Selection and the Generation Gap, 59 
IOWA L. REV. 401 (1973) (young people); see also Jeff Rosen, Jurymandering, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 
30, 1992, at 15 (race); Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure?  A Contemporary 
Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707 (1993) (race). 
2   See Sarah K.S. Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People with 
Felony Records in the United States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795 (2017). 
3   See James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased: Is There Empirical 
Support for Excluding Convicted Felons from Jury Service?, 36 L. & POL’Y 1 (2014) [hereinafter 
Binnall, Field Study]; see also James M. Binnall, Summonsing Criminal Desistance: Convicted 
Felons’ Perspectives on Jury Service, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 4, 4 (2018) [hereinafter Binnall, 
Summonsing]. 
4   Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felon from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65 (2003); see 
also Binnall, Field Study, supra note 3, at 20. 
5   See Rubio v. Super. Ct. of San Joaquin Cty., 593 P.2d 595, 600 (Cal. 1979) (“The 
Legislature could reasonably determine that a person who has suffered the most severe form of 
condemnation that can be inflicted by the state—a conviction of felony and punishment therefor—
might well harbor a continuing resentment against ‘the system’ that punished him and an equally 
unthinking bias in favor of the defendant on trial, who is seen as a fellow underdog caught in its 
toils.”); see also Carle v. United States, 705 A.2d 682, 686 (D.C. 1998) (“The presumptively ‘shared 
attitudes’ of convicted felons as they relate to the goal of juror impartiality are a primary reason for 
the exclusion . . . .”). 
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the group’s pro-defense pre-trial bias is statistically indistinguishable from at least 
one other sub-group of prospective jurors—law students.6 
Critics of our current jury system argue that jurors are too often swayed by 
extralegal factors.  Some go so far as to describe jurors as “gullible creatures, too 
often driven by emotion and too easily motivated by prejudice, anger, and pity.”7  
Taking this view, ideal jurors are those who assess litigated issues in a vacuum, 
without reference to “sources of knowledge not formally admitted into evidence.”8  
Other commentators suggest that the jury system ought to embrace rather than 
disparage a juror’s prior experiences and beliefs.  As Jeffrey Abramson has argued, 
“[t]o eliminate potential jurors on the grounds that they will bring the biases of 
their group into the jury room is . . . to misunderstand the democratic task of the 
jury, which is nothing else than to represent accurately the diversity of views held 
in a heterogeneous society . . . .”9 
Like Abramson, the Supreme Court has long favored inclusive juries.  In a 
famous excerpt from Peters v. Kiff, Justice Thurgood Marshall explained one of 
the many advantages of diverse jury pools: 
 
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded 
from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of 
human nature and varieties of human experience . . . unknown and 
perhaps unknowable . . . .  [E]xclusion deprives the jury of a perspective 
on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that 
may be presented.10 
 
Accordingly, the Court has continually sought to expand juror participation 
and eliminate discriminatory jury selection practices. 11   Still, the Court has 
implicitly authorized the exclusion of convicted felons from jury service,12 and 
U.S. jurisdictions have overwhelmingly chosen to banish those with felonious 
criminal pasts from the adjudicative process.13 
                                                                                                                       
6   See Binnall, Field Study, supra note 3, at 20. 
7   SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 4 (1983). 
8   Id. at 7–8. 
9   JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 101 
(1994). 
10  Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1972). 
11  See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1879); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 
217, 220 (1946); Peters, 407 U.S. at 500 n.10; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525, 530 (1975); 
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
12  See Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cty., 396 U.S. 320, 327 (1970). 
13  See infra Figure 1 and Appendix; see also Binnall, Summonsing, supra note 3. 
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This article questions that policy, suggesting that by excluding convicted 
felons from jury service, while permitting all other discernable groups of jurors to 
take part, the vast majority of jurisdictions engage in the destructive practice of 
viewpoint jurymandering.  This article draws on recent empirical findings to 
support its premise. 
Specifically, the present study builds on my own prior research, replicating 
my 2014 field study with a population of law enforcement personnel.  In this 
study, as I did previously, I use an established measure of pre-trial bias, the 
Revised Juror Bias Scale (RJBS).  I then assess the pre-trial biases of 211 current 
law enforcement personnel.  Two inquiries drive this research.  First, do law 
enforcement personnel harbor pro-prosecution/anti-defense pre-trial biases?  
Second, how do those biases compare to prior research on the pre-trial biases of 
convicted felons?  The goal of this study is to, for the first time, provide data on 
the pre-trial biases of law enforcement personnel and to indirectly evaluate the 
empirical validity of the inherent bias rationale for felon-juror exclusion. 
Part II offers an overview of juror eligibility criteria impacting convicted 
felons and law enforcement personnel.  Part III discusses prior empirical research 
on the benefits of diverse juries.  Part IV details the methods of the present study.  
Part V presents findings, and Part VI situates those findings in a larger discussion 
of jury diversity, convicted felons, and reentry. 
 
II. SURVEYING JUROR ELIGIBILITY: CONVICTED FELONS VS. LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
As noted above, all but one U.S. jurisdiction place restrictions on a convicted 
felon’s juror eligibility.14  Yet, the severity of those restrictions varies.  In twenty-
eight jurisdictions, the restriction is permanent, banning convicted felons from jury 
service for life.  Thirteen states bar convicted felons from jury service until the full 
completion of their sentence, notably disqualifying individuals serving felony-
parole and felony-probation.  Eight states enforce hybrid regulations that may 
incorporate penal status, charge category, type of jury proceeding, and/or a term of 
years.15  And finally, two states recognize lifetime for-cause challenges, permitting 
a trial judge to dismiss a prospective juror from the venire solely on the basis of a 
felony conviction. 16  Moreover, in all but four jurisdictions, felon-juror exclusion 
                                                                                                                       
14  Maine places no restriction on a convicted felon’s juror eligibility criteria.  See ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1211 (2017). 
15  For example, the District of Columbia and Colorado adhere to differing hybrid models; the 
former excludes convicted felons from jury service during any period of supervision and for ten years 
following the termination of supervision, while the latter excludes convicted felons solely from grand 
jury proceedings.  See D.C. CODE § 11-1906(b)(2)(B) (1994); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
71-105(3) (2016). 
16  See infra Figure 1 for a jurisdictional breakdown of juror eligibility criteria for convicted 
felons. 
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statutes are categorical, barring all convicted felons from serving as jurors in all 
types of litigation.17 
Conversely, very few jurisdictions restrict law enforcement personnel’s access 
to the jury process.  Only thirteen jurisdictions disqualify law enforcement 
personnel from the venire, and of those thirteen, two only disqualify in criminal 
matters.18  In all remaining thirty-nine jurisdictions, law enforcement personnel can 
become part of a venire and are permitted to adjudicate both civil and criminal 
matters.19 
 
Figure 1: Felon-juror Exclusion Policies by Jurisdiction 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
17  Arizona: distinguishes first time offenders from repeat offenders; Colorado: distinguishes 
grand juries from petit juries; Nevada: distinguishes violent offenders from non-violent offenders, 
Oregon: distinguishes civil cases from criminal cases.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-912(A) 
(2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-105(3) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.157(2) (2005); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §10.030 (3)(A)(E)–(F) (2009). 
18  Those jurisdictions are Oklahoma and Indiana.  See Appendix. 
19  See infra Figure 2 and Appendix for a jurisdictional breakdown of juror eligibility criteria 
impacting law enforcement personnel. 
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Figure 2: Law Enforcement Personnel Juror Eligibility by Jurisdiction 
Notably, in a comparison of juror eligibility criteria, twenty jurisdictions 
exclude prospective felon-jurors for life, while allowing law enforcement 
personnel to serve without restriction.  Another thirteen jurisdictions exclude 
convicted felons until the full completion of their sentence or impose lifetime 
challenges for cause based on a felony criminal conviction, while those same 
jurisdictions place no restriction on law enforcement personnel’s opportunity to 
take part in jury service. 20   In sum, while the vast majority of jurisdictions 
seemingly view the life experiences of convicted felons as a liability, those same 
jurisdictions conceive of law enforcement personnel’s experiences as an asset. 
 
III. THE VALUE OF DIVERSE JURIES: PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
As courts and commentators have recognized, the benefits of diverse juries 
are far reaching.  In particular, research tends to demonstrate that jury diversity 
bolsters deliberation quality, promotes broader civic engagement, and legitimizes 
jury verdicts in the eyes of the general public.21 
                                                                                                                       
20  See Appendix. 
21  See Erin York Cornwall & Valerie P. Hans, Representation through Participation: A 
Multilevel Analysis of Jury Deliberations, 45 L. & SOC. REV. 667 (2011). 
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On measures of deliberation quality, theoretically derived from process-
oriented criteria relating to jurors’ duties, 22 researchers have compared 
homogeneous juries to mixed juries.  In those studies, focused on race,23 gender,24 
and view of the death penalty,25 evidence suggests that jury diversity increases the 
quality of jury deliberations.  In particular, studies tend to show that mixed juries 
perform better than homogeneous juries in the areas of fact recall and deliberation 
duration. 26   Jurors on mixed juries also report higher satisfaction with 
deliberations.27  
Research also tends to demonstrate that jury service can prompt higher levels 
of systematic civic engagement.28  For example, in a series of studies, political 
scientists have discovered that those who participate in jury service are more likely 
to vote in subsequent elections (the participation hypothesis). 29   In one study, 
researchers found that for infrequent voters (voting less than 50% of the time), jury 
service prompted greater rates of voting.30  In particular, data suggests that among 
infrequent voters, jury service increased subsequent voting rates by 4–7%.31 
Finally, diverse juries likely translate into more positive views of jury 
verdicts.  As compared to those rendered by less diverse juries, verdicts rendered 
by juries that are perceived to represent an adequate cross section of the 
community are viewed as more legitimate. 32  Notably, as MacCoun and Tyler 
                                                                                                                       
22  See Dennis J. Devine et al., Deliberation Quality: A Preliminary Examination in Criminal 
Juries, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.  273 (2007). 
23  See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying 
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 597 (2006). 
24  See Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659 (2002). 
25  See Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors’ Predisposition 
to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984). 
26  See id.; see also Marder, supra note 24, at 664. 
27  See Marder, supra note 24, at 664. 
28  John Gastil et al., Civic Awakening in the Jury Room: A Test of the Connection between 
Jury Deliberation and Political Participation, 64 J. OF POL. 585, 592 (2002); John Gastil & Phillip J. 
Weiser, Jury Service as an Invitation to Citizenship: Assessing the Civic Value of Institutionalized 
Deliberation, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 605, 615 (2006); JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: 
HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (2010). 
29  Id. 
30  John Gastil et al., Jury Service and Electoral Participation: A Test of the Participation 
Hypothesis, 70 J. OF POL. 351 (2008). 
31  Id. at 359. 
32  See Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: 
Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033 (2003); see also NEIL VIDMAR & 
VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT (2007); Joshua Wilkenfeld, Newly Compelling: 
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discovered, citizens’ evaluations of the jury account for far more than cost and 
accuracy. 33   Similarly, Fukurai and Davies found that in a telephone poll of 
California residents, 67.3% of respondents felt that a jury verdict rendered by a 
racially-diverse jury is fairer than one rendered by a single-race jury.34 
 
IV. METHODS 
 
This exploratory field study explores the pre-trial biases of law enforcement 
personnel.  I hypothesize the law enforcement personnel, as a group, will harbor a 
pro-prosecution/anti-defense pre-trial bias and that such a bias will present at a 
strength similar to or exceeding the pro-defense/anti-prosecution pre-trial bias 
exhibited by convicted felons in a prior field study. 
 
A. Participants 
 
The present study is comprised of 211 current law enforcement personnel.  I 
recruited participants from California’s Peace Officer’s Standards and Training 
(POST) training classes over the course of 12 months in 2016–2017.  As part of 
their continued training, California Law Enforcement agencies require that officers 
regularly complete POST trainings. 35   At those meetings, I solicited the 
participation of law enforcement personnel.  To ensure that I did not condition 
participants, my solicitation included only a brief overview of the study.  Because 
this study took place in California, California’s juror eligibility served as the 
exclusionary criteria.36  
Using these recruitment methods, I was able to secure a diverse sample.  Of 
the 211 participants, 27 (13%) are women and 184 (87%) are men.  Participants’ 
ages ranged considerably from 24 to 64 with an average age of 43 (SD = 7.61).  
                                                                                                                       
Reexamining Judicial Construction of Juries in the Aftermath of Grutter v. Bollinger, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2291 (2004); Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the 
Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1988). 
33  See MacCoun & Tyler, supra note 32, at 349. 
34  See Hiroshi Fukurai & Darryl Davies, Affirmative Action in Jury Selection: Racially 
Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and Affirmative Juries of the Hennepin Model and the Jury De 
Medietate Linguae, 4 VA. J. OF SOC. POL’Y & L. 645 (1997). 
35  State of California, POST COMMISSION ON PEACE OFFICERS STANDARDS AND TRAININGS, 
https://www.post.ca.gov/training (last updated Oct. 10, 2018, 2:39 PM). 
36  The criteria requires that a prospective juror 1) must be a citizen of the United States, 2) 
must be 18 years of age, 3) must be domiciliaries of the State of California, 4) must be residents of 
the jurisdiction they are summoned to serve, 5) must not have been convicted of malfeasance in 
office or a felony, 6) must possess sufficient knowledge of the English language (sufficient to 
understand court proceedings), 7) must not be already serving as grand or trial jurors in any court in 
the State, and 8) must not be the subject of a conservatorship. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203(a) 
(Deering 1994). 
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Years in their current occupation—law enforcement—ranged from 1 to 39, with an 
average of 17.5 years of service (SD = 7.76).  Of the 211 participants who took 
part in the study, 55 percent self-identified as “white,” 25 percent as “Latino/a,” 6 
percent as “Asian-American,” 6 percent as “African-American,” and 8 percent as 
some other ethnicity.  All were native English speakers. 
The participant pool also had varied responses to inquiries relating to the jury 
system and crime generally.  Only 23 percent of participants indicated prior jury 
service.  Twenty-six percent of respondents stated that, if called, they would 
attempt to avoid jury service.  Prior service and avoidances notwithstanding, an 
overwhelming majority of participants—83 percent—indicated that they believed 
they would be excellent jurors.  On views of crime, 27 percent reported having 
been the victim of a violent crime.  Eighty-eight percent support or strongly 
support the death penalty, and 55 percent reported a political perspective of very 
conservative or conservative. 
 
B. Measures 
 
To assess the potential pre-trial biases of law enforcement personnel, I used 
an established scale of pre-trial bias, the Revised Juror Bias Scale (RJBS).37  The 
scale, developed by Myers and Lecci, measures the pre-trial biases of prospective 
jurors.38  Based on two underlying constructs, probability of commission (PC), and 
reasonable doubt (RD), the RJBS consists of twelve questions that assess a juror’s 
pre-trial propensity to favor either the defense or the prosecution. Scored on a 
standard five-category Likert scale (strongly disagree, disagree, no opinion, agree, 
strongly agree), the RJBS produces total scores that range from 12 to 60, with a 
median scale score of 36.39  Scores below the median indicate a pro-defense pre-
trial bias, while scores above the median indicate a pro-prosecution pre-trial bias.40  
In prior studies, the RJBS has proven to be a robust predictor of pre-trial biases.41 
Along with RJBS scores, I also collected data on other participant 
characteristics shown to impact pre-trial biases.  Those variables include: age, 
gender, race, native language, occupational status, religion, socioeconomic status, 
                                                                                                                       
37  See Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence Wrightsman, The Construction and Validation of a Juror 
Bias Scale, 17 J. OF RES. IN PERSONALITY 423 (1983) (The RJBS is a revised, more robust version of 
the original Juror Bias Scale (JBS) developed by Kassin and Wrightsman). 
38  Bryan Myers & Len Lecci, Revising the Factor Structure of the Juror Bias Scale: A 
Method for the Empirical Validation of Theoretical Constructs, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 239 (1998). 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  See DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF SCIENCE, 106–07 (2012); see 
also Len Lecci & Bryan Myers, Examining the Construct Validity of the Original and Revised JBS: A 
Cross-Validation of Sample and Method, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 455 (2002). 
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level of education, history of victimization, political affiliation, and view of the 
death penalty.42 
 
V. RESULTS 
 
A. The Pre-Trial Biases of Law Enforcement Personnel 
 
To assess the group-level pre-trial biases of law enforcement personnel, I first 
examined the dispersion of participants’ scores on the RJBS.  On the RJBS, 
participants’ scores ranged from 24 to 54.  These results suggest that the pre-trial 
biases of law enforcement personnel are not homogeneous, but instead vary 
substantially.  A frequency distribution of scores on the RJBS reveals that, of the 
211 participants, 144 scored at or above the scale median (36), suggesting that 
68% of participants possessed a pro-prosecution pre-trial bias. 
As a group, data also demonstrate that participants harbor a pro-
prosecution/anti-defense pre-trial bias.  On the RJBS, law enforcement personnel’s 
mean score (38.86) landed above the scale median (36).  This result tends to 
demonstrate that law enforcement personnel, as a group, harbor pro-
prosecution/anti-defense pre-trial biases.  Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of law 
enforcement personnel’s scores on the RJBS. 
 
B. Law Enforcement Personnel vs. Convicted Felons 
 
In my prior field study of pre-trial biases, I compared the pre-trial biases of 
convicted felons to two other groups of eligible jurors.  In that study, I found that 
on the RJBS, the otherwise eligible felon-jurors’ mean score (33.29) fell below the 
scale median (36), suggesting that convicted felons, as a group, harbored a pro-
defense/anti-prosecution pre-trial bias. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
42  See Binnall, Field Study, supra note 3, at 11 (describing the theoretical bases for the 
demographic variables chosen). 
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Figure 3: 
 
In the same study, I compared the pre-trial biases of convicted felons to those 
of eligible jurors generally and eligible jurors enrolled in law school.  I found that 
while convicted felons harbored a stronger pro-defense/anti-prosecution pre-trial 
bias than did eligible jurors generally, convicted felons’ pre-trial biases were not 
statistically distinguishable from those of law students (p = .291).43 
In the present study, law enforcement’s mean score on the RJBS (38.86) was 
2.86 units above the scale median.  In my 2014 study, convicted felons’ mean 
score (33.29) was 2.71 units below the scale median, a statistically significant 
difference (p = .218).  This result seemingly suggests that on a scale of pre-trial 
biases, convicted felons are as pro-defense/anti-prosecution as law enforcement 
personnel are anti-defense/pro-prosecution.  Nonetheless, the law statutorily 
excludes only one group of prospective jurors from the jury process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
43  See Binnall, Field Study, supra note 3, at 14. 
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Table: Revised Juror Bias Scale Scores by Group—Descriptive Statistics 
   
   
 Convicted Felons Law Enforcement 
   
   
N 234 211 
Mean 33.29 38.86 
Median (36) 33 39 
Std. Deviation 6.08 5.39 
Range (12–60) 17–55 24–54 
 
  
Note: Parentheses indicate the scale properties.  The RJBS’s median score is 36 and its possible 
range is 12–60.   
 
C. Study Limitations 
 
The results of this exploratory study are limited.  First, to sample law 
enforcement personnel, I relied on volunteer participants from California’s POST 
trainings.  This recruitment method likely introduced a measure of selection bias.  
Second, to make comparisons between convicted felons and law enforcement 
personnel, I used data from a prior field study of eligible jurors with a felony 
criminal conviction.  Though I replicated the study, the elapsed time since data 
collection in the prior field study, three years, likely introduces unknown and 
unknowable temporal issues.  For these reasons, the results of the present study are 
suggestive only.  However, they do shed light on an important issue relating to 
felon-juror exclusion and the possible legislative biasing of jury pools through 
exclusionary statutes. 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
 
The United States incarcerates more of its citizens than any other country in 
the world. 44   Today, over 2.3 million Americans are behind bars.45   Research 
estimates that 3 percent of adults have been to prison, and 8 percent of adults, 19 
million American citizens, have been convicted of a felony.46 
                                                                                                                       
44  See Peter Wagner & Alison Walsh, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2016, THE 
PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (June 16, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2016.html. 
45  See Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2017, THE 
PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (March 14, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2017.html; see 
also Paul Guerino, Paige M. Harrison &William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2010, BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT. BULL., Dec. 2011, at 1. 
46  See Shannon et al., supra note 2, at 1795. 
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This disturbing normalization of a felony criminal record is the direct result of 
the United States’ experiment with mass incarceration, an experiment that has 
disproportionately impacted the African-American community.47  While 8 percent 
of all adults bear the mark of a felony conviction, almost triple that many African-
American adults (23 percent) have been convicted of a felony in the United 
States.48  For African-American adult men, the outlook is even bleaker.  Roughly 
one-third of all African-American adult males are also convicted felons.49 
Though the drivers of mass incarceration are critically worthy topics, they are 
far beyond the scope of this article.  Instead, this article suggests that, like it or not, 
the United States’ has now cultivated a distinct and sizable population of citizens 
who have had direct contact with the criminal justice system.  Alleging that their 
resulting perspectives make them unfit for jury service feels tautological. 
The inherent bias rationale for felon-juror exclusion, while ostensibly the 
codification of logic, instead rests on irrational presumptions about convicted 
felons and the threat of their pre-trial biases.50  Data from this field study suggests 
that law enforcement personnel are as pro-prosecution as convicted felons are pro-
defense.  As interpreted by courts and lawmakers, the inherent bias rationale 
therefore demands that pre-trial biases, in either direction, warrant exclusion from 
the venire.  Under that view, law enforcement personnel merit banishment.  Yet, 
such an approach, like felon-juror exclusion statutes themselves, contradicts over a 
century of Supreme Court precedent weighing in favor of broad participation in the 
jury process.  Rather than exclude law enforcement personnel, jurisdictions ought 
to embrace their distinctive perspectives, along with those of their convicted 
counterparts. 
Precedent aside, narrowing jury pools by excluding convicted felons also 
impacts the diversity of juries.  In the first empirical study of felon-juror exclusion, 
Wheelock found that in several Georgia counties, felon-juror exclusion served to 
racially homogenize juries, reducing the number of African-American males who 
serve.51  The prevalence of criminal justice contact among the African-American 
community makes the impact of felon-juror exclusion statutes racially disparate.  
Importantly, research demonstrates that diverse juries outperform homogeneous 
                                                                                                                       
47  See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2012); see also DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN 
ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007). 
48  See Shannon et al., supra note 2, at 1807. 
49  Id. 
50  See Binnall, Summonsing, supra note 3, at 6. 
51  Darren Wheelock, A Jury of One’s “Peers”: Felon Jury Exclusion and Racial Inequality in 
Georgia Courts, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 335 (2012). 
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juries on several measures of deliberation quality.52  Thus, felon-juror exclusion 
statutes, rather than protecting deliberations, may undermine them. 53 
Restricting convicted felons’ access to jury pools also deprives inclusion to 
those arguably most in need of inclusion.  Research suggests that the success of 
strengths-based models of reentry, those that seek to identify and exploit the 
positive attributes of former offenders, turns on a reconceptualization of 
community engagement.54  Rather than conceiving community engagement as an 
outcome variable, advocates of strengths-based approaches view community 
engagement as a necessary precursor to successful reintegration and criminal 
desistance.55  By excluding convicted felons from arguably the most direct form of 
civic participation, jurisdictions foreclose a significant pro-social opportunity for 
former offenders to re-engage the community. 56 
Finally, by excluding convicted felons from jury service, a majority of U.S. 
jurisdictions risk delegitimizing verdicts.  Research demonstrates that traditionally 
marginalized populations question the legitimacy of verdicts when a jury appears 
unrepresentative of their community. 57   As statistics indicate, in the African-
American community, a felony conviction is no longer an unusual occurrence.58  
Moreover, recent high profile cases involving African-Americans and use of 
deadly force by law enforcement have led many to question the legitimacy of 
policing policy.59  Couple these tragic events with juror eligibility statutes that 
                                                                                                                       
52  See Sommers, supra note 23; see also Marder, supra note 24; Cowan et al., supra note 25. 
53  James M. Binnall, Jury Diversity in the Age of Mass Incarceration: An Exploratory Mock 
Jury Experiment Examining Felon-Jurors’ Potential Impacts on Deliberation Quality, PSYCHOL. 
CRIME & L. (2018). 
54  See Shadd Maruna & Thomas P. LeBel, Welcome Home? Examining the “Reentry Court” 
Concept from a Strengths-Based Perspective, 4 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 91, 97 (2003); see also 
Bronwyn A. Hunter et al., A Strengths-Based Approach to Prisoner Reentry: The Fresh Start 
Prisoner Reentry Program, 60 INT’L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1298 (2016); 
Gordon Bazemore & Rachel Boba, “Doing Good” to “Making Good”: Community Theory for 
Practice in a Restorative Justice Civic Engagement Reentry Model, 46 J. OF OFFENDER 
REHABILITATION 25 (2007). 
55  See Kathryn J. Fox, Theorizing Community Integration as Desistance Promotion, 42(1) 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 82, 83 (2015). 
56  James M. Binnall, Felon-Jurors in Vacationland: A Field Study of Transformative Civic 
Engagement in Maine, 71 ME. L. REV. 71 (2019). 
57  See Wilkenfeld, supra note 32; see also MacCoun & Tyler, supra note 32. 
58  See Shannon et al., supra note 2, at 1795; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 47. 
59  Alison V. Hall, Erika V. Hall & Jamie L. Perry, Black and Blue: Exploring Racial Bias and 
Law Enforcement in the Killing of Unarmed Black Male Civilians, 71 A. PSYCHOLOGIST 175 (2016); 
Scott E. Culhane, John H. Boman IV & Kimberly Schweitzer, Public Perceptions of the Justifiability 
of Police Shootings: The Role of Body Cameras in a Pre- and Post-Ferguson Experiment, 19 POLICE 
Q. 251, 252 (2016). 
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banish convicted felons while welcoming law enforcement personnel, despite each 
harboring pre-trial biases of similar strength, and the legitimacy of the jury process 
rightfully comes under scrutiny. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In 2012, a jury of six women—five Caucasian and one Latina—acquitted 
George Zimmerman of the shooting death of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed 
seventeen-year-old African-American.60  The trial and subsequent verdict reignited 
debates about the representativeness of juries in the United States.  Many 
commentators argued that the racial composition of the jury made a guilty verdict 
unlikely and made the rendered verdict illegitimate.61  Still, felon-juror exclusion 
escaped critical analysis.  Unfortunately, felon-juror exclusion statutes, based on 
flawed presumptions and targeting the already marginalized, threaten to make 
homogenous juries the norm rather than the exception. 
The present study demonstrates the flaws underlying the inherent bias 
rationale, calling into question the true purpose of felon-juror exclusion statutes.  
This study also raises more fundamental questions about how we conceive juries, 
what steps we are willing to take to ensure representativeness, and how we 
reestablish the jury as “the most stunning and successful experiment in direct 
popular sovereignty in all history.”62 
                                                                                                                       
60  See Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon 
Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law, 23 
U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 271, 279 (2012); Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and 
Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013); Mark S. Brodin, The 
Murder of Black Males in a World of Non-Accountability: The Surreal Trial of George Zimmerman 
for the Killing of Trayvon Martin, 59 HOW. L. J. 765, 766 (2016). 
61  See Lawson, supra note 60. 
62  William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 69 (2006). 
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JUROR ELIGIBILITY BY JURISDICTION: 
CONVICTED FELONS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL 
 
JURISDICTION CONVICTED FELONS 
(EXCLUSION TYPE)63 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
(DISQUALIFIED) 
   
Federal Life Yes64 
   
Alabama Life No65 
   
Alaska During Sentence No66 
   
Arizona Hybrid No67 
   
Arkansas Life No68 
   
California Life Yes69 
   
Colorado Hybrid Yes70 
   
Connecticut Hybrid No71 
   
Delaware Life No72 
   
District of Colombia Hybrid No73 
   
                                                                                                                       
63  See Binnall, Field Study, supra note 3 (Listing each jurisdiction’s statutory approach to 
felon-juror exclusion). 
64  See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6) (2000). 
65  ALA. CODE § 12-16-150 (2016). 
66  ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.020 (2002). 
67  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-211 (2018). 
68  ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-101 (2016). 
69  CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 219(b)(1). 
70  COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-104(4) (2017). 
71  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-217(a) (7) (2015). 
72  DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 10, § 4509(b)(6) (2018). 
73  D.C. CODE § 11-1906(b)(2)(B)(3) (2018). 
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Florida Life Yes74 
   
Georgia Life No75 
   
Hawaii Life Yes76 
   
Idaho During Sentence No77 
   
Illinois Lifetime For Cause No78 
   
Indiana During Sentence Yes (Criminal Only)79 
   
Iowa Lifetime For Cause No80 
   
Kansas Hybrid Yes81 
   
Kentucky Life No82 
   
Louisiana Life No83 
   
Maine None No84 
   
Maryland Life No85 
   
                                                                                                                       
74  FLA. STAT. § 40.013(2)(b) (2017). 
75  GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-1.1(a)(1) (2016). 
76  HAW. REV. STAT. § 612-6 (2017). 
77  IDAHO CODE § 2-212 (2017). 
78  705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2(a) (2018). 
79  IND. CODE § 34-5(h), IND. CODE ANN. tit. 34, Jury R. 5. 
80  IOWA CODE ANN. § 607A.5. 
81  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-159(b).  See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-158(c). 
82  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29A.090.  See also Reid v. Commonwealth, 659 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29A.080. 
83  LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 401(A)-(B). 
84  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1211. 
85  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §8-306. 
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Massachusetts Hybrid No86 
   
Michigan Life No87 
   
Minnesota During Sentence No88 
   
Mississippi Life No89 
   
Missouri Life No90 
   
Montana During Sentence No91 
   
Nebraska Life Yes92 
   
Nevada Hybrid Yes93 
   
New Hampshire Life No94 
   
New Jersey Life No95 
   
New Mexico During Sentence No96 
   
New York Life No97 
   
                                                                                                                       
86  MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 234A, § 4.  See also Com v. Silva 918 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 2009). 
87  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1307(a). 
88  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 808(b).  See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 810. 
89  MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1. 
90  MO. REV. STAT. § 494.425.  See also State v. Cole 71 S.W.3d 163 (Mo. 2002). 
91  MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-301.  See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-303. 
92  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1601(1)(c)-(d). 
93  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.020.  See also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 617.135. 
94  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500-A:7-a. 
95  N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-1.  See also State v. Reynolds, 592 A.2d 194 (N.J. 1991). 
96  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-1(B). 
97  N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510 (McKinney 2018). See also People v. Noakes, 869 N.Y.S.2d 424 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
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North Carolina During Sentence No98 
   
North Dakota During Sentence No99 
   
Ohio During Sentence No100 
   
Oklahoma Life Yes (Criminal Only)101 
   
Oregon Hybrid No102 
   
Pennsylvania Life No103 
   
Rhode Island During Sentence Yes104 
   
South Carolina Life Yes105 
   
South Dakota During Sentence No106 
   
Tennessee Life No107 
   
Texas Life No108 
   
Utah Life No109 
   
Vermont Life No110 
                                                                                                                       
98  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN § 9-3. 
99  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-09.1-08(2). 
100 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.17(B). 
101 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 28(C)(3), (D).  See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 28(D). 
102 OR. REV. STAT. ANN §10.030(2). 
103 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4502(a). 
104 102 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-9-3.  See also 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-9-1.1(c). 
105 S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-820. 
106 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-13-10. 
107 TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-1-101. 
108 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.102. 
109 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-105. See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-108. 
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Virginia Life Yes111 
   
Washington During Sentence No112 
   
West Virginia Life No113 
   
Wisconsin During Sentence No114 
   
Wyoming Life No (Exempted)115 116 
 
                                                                                                                       
110 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 962. 
111 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-341(7). 
112 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.36.070. 
113 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 52-1-8(a). 
114 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 756.02. 
115 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-11-103.  See also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-11-102. 
116 Dr. Binnall would like to thank Ron Mark, the Director of the Center for Criminal Justice 
Research & Training, without his expertise and assistance this study would not have been possible.  
He would also like to thank Danielle Rini for her invaluable work as a research assistant. 
